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Abstract:  During the 1980s several qualitative  changes 
occurred  in the union decline.  First, net gains  from 
certification  (less decertification)  elections  fel.l  to 
insignificant  levels, tending to accelerate  the union 
decline.  On the other hand, union  losses  from the 
relative  growth of nonunion  services  (structural change) 
also declined  sharply as unionization  rates became more 
homogeneous  across sectors.  As a consequence,  virtually 
all changes  in the unionization  rate during  the 1980s 
were caused by disproportional  gains  in nonunion 
employment  within  sectors  (restructuring). 
The erosion  of private  sector unionization  during  the 
past thirty-five  years  is by now a familiar  fact among  labor 
economists  as are many of the reasons  for the decline. 
Unions  suffered  losses  from structural  shifts as relative 
employment  grew  in nonunion  sectors and from restructuring 
as unionization  rates  fell sharply within virtually  every 
industry  in the private  sector.  Of equal  importance  is the 
fact that unions have  found it increasingly  more difficult 
to recover these losses through certification  elections. 
Each of these three sources of decline,  elections, 
structural  change,  and restructuring  have been subjected  to 
extensive  analysis  but seldom  in a single  study.  Also, most 
of the studies  on each of these topics  focus on changes  in 2 
the 1960s and 1970s which  are not exactly  representative  of 
what occurred  during  the 1980s.  The unique  contribution  of 
this paper  is that  it combines  estimates  of union gains  from 
elections  with structural  losses and restructuring  in order 
to provide  a comprehensive  profile  of changes  in the U.S. 
unionization  rate from 1962 to 1989.  This approach 
illustrates  how certain  factors have continued  to erode 
union membership  during  the 1980s while  others have not. 
For example  union gains through  representation  elections 
continued  it's historical  decline while  structural  losses 
from the growth of nonunion  services gradually  tapered  off. 
As a result,  neither  certification  elections  nor structural 
change had much effect on unionization  rates by the end of 
the 1980s.  Most of the recent decline  has been caused  by 
the disproportionate  growth  of nonunion  employment  in the 
private  sector. 
. 
Unionization  Rates: Totals  and Changes 
The trend of private  sector unionization  in the United 
States during  the past thirty years  is familiar  and graphed 
in Figure  1.'  Perhaps  less obvious  is the fact that the 
rate of change  in unionization,  illustrated  in the second 
panel, has been extremely  volatile.  In both the early 
period,  1962 to 1976, and the later period,  1985 to 1989, 
1  The unionization  rate is defined  as total private  sector 
union membership  divided  by the nonagricultural  private 
sector  labor  force. 3 
annual changes  in the unionization  rate ranged between  -.4 
and -.6 percentage  points.  However,  union  losses  soared 
between  -.6 and -1.2 percentage  points during  the important 
period  from 1976 to 1985.  This period was obviously  a 
critical  stage in the decline  of unions  as they  lost a total 
of 13.3 percentage  points  in nine years compared  to only 9.4 
points  during the remaining  eighteen.  Equally  important  is 
the fact that this collapse  in union membership  apparently 
subsided  by 1985 as annual  losses returned  to their previous 
historical  level.  There are of course many possible 
explanations  for this pattern  (recessions, deregulation,  oil 
crises,  and trade deficits)  but before considering  them  in 
detail  it is useful to consider the effects  of elections  and 
structural  change. 
Representation  Elections 
What  Figure  1 does not show is that the annual  change  in 
the unionization  rate is the net result of gains  from 
certification  elections  less gross losses  from other 
sources.  Throughout  this entire period,  1962 to 1989, union 
gains  from certification  elections have steadily  declined 
and losses from decertification  elections  have grown  (but 
not enough to be particularly  significant).  An important 
study by Dickens and Leonard  (1985) analysed  the trend  in 
union gains  from certification  elections  using  data  from the 
National  Labor Relations  Board and the Bureau  of Labor 4 
Statistics  for 1950 to 1980.  They found that  from 
representation  elections  alone the unionization  rate would 
have  increased by 1.7 percentage  points  in 1950.  But 
because  of declining  success  in elections,  the unionization 
rate would have  increased  only  .2 points  in 1980.* 
Unfortunately  their series ends in 1980, making  it necessary 
to update  their calculations  to 1989 based  on similiar 
assumptions  and methods.3  \ 
The results  are presented  in Figure  2 which  shows the 
change  in private  sector unionization  that would have 
occurred  from representation  elections  alone,  including 
relatively  small losses  from decertification  elections. 
According  to this graph, the contribution  of elections  began 
to diminish  after  1965 and by 1980 elections  had very  little 
effect  on the overall unionization  rate.  To illustrate  this 
point,  imagine that the only change  in unionization  was  from 
elections.  Based on the election gains made  in 1989, it 
would  take unions twenty-five  years to recoup  just one 
percentage  point,  equivalent  to the actual  amount  lost every 
year  from 1980 to 1985. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
* If we define U as total union membership  and L as the 
labor  force, then the values  reported by Dickens  and Leonard 
are AU/U which  are converted  to AU/L in this study. 
3  These basic assumptions  are as follows:  5% of voters 
eligible  to vote  in certification  elections  are already 
counted  as union members,  12% of voters  in elections  won by 
unions  fail to become  union members,  and 50% of the workers 
involved  in decertification  elections  are not considered 
union members  at the time of elections. 5 
Why are unions performing  so poorly  in certification 
elections?  This question  has been extensively  studied by 
other authors who have pointed  to the important  role of 
management  opposition  and anti-union  consultants  in 
defeating  unions.  Certainly  unions have always been 
subjected  to strong opposition  but they appear particularly 
defenseless  in the face of modern management  practices 
designed  to prevent  certification  elections  or at the very 
least to defeat unions  if an election  is actually  held. 
Although  there are no comprehensive  statistics  on total 
expenditures  for this type of activity,  there  is little 
doubt that  it has been  increasing.  The proliferation  of 
anti-union  consulting  firms in the 1970s and 80s attests  to 
the success  of this relatively  new enterprise. 
At the same time, unions have demonstrated  little 
evidence  of escalating  their own organizing  efforts  to meet 
this growing  challenge.  Paula Voos has documented  that real 
union  organizing  expenditures  per union member  have  changed 
very  little.  In 1962 the average union member  contributed  a 
mere  $3.92 a year  for union organizing  and by 1974 this had 
increased  to only $4.16  (1967 dollars).  Vods also  found  ',' 
evidence  that organizing  outlays as a percentage  of total 
union  expenditures  declined  significantly  from 1953 to 1977. 
It 'does  not appear that union efforts to win elections  have 
been any match  for the offensive  led by management 
consultants. 6 
The positions  are essentially  reversed  from the 1930s 
when unions were on the offensive.  In 1936, John  L. Lewis, 
president  of the newly formed Congress  of Industrial 
Organization,  pledged  $500,000 to support the  flagging 
effort to organize  the steel  industry.  With  this gesture 
Lewis  initiated  the "huge organizing  drive  financed by 
millions  rather than hundreds  of dollars.V14 In the same 
year the International  Ladies Garment Workers  Union  assessed 
their members  $1 each to finance the drive  in steel.  It is 
important  to remember that the inspired organizing  successes 
of the  1930s and 40s were backed by massive  escalations  in 
union expenditures. 
Structural  Change 
If the only source.of  change  in unionization  was 
certification  elections,  then these two variables  would move 
in parallel  over time.  But comparing  the contribution  of 
elections  to the actual change  in Figure 2 shows this  is not 
the case.  The union decline  accelerated  between  1976 and 
1984 at a much  faster rate than can be explained  by 
elections  alone and even more  strik,ing  is the  improvement 
since  1985, at a time when election  gains  remained  extremely 
low. 
The vertical  distance  between  the two curves  in Figure  2 
is defined  as ttgrosstl  losses since it represents  changes 
4 Bernstein,  1969, page 436. 7 
from all sources other than representation  elections.  One 
explanation  for these large annual losses  is structural 
change,  i.e. the autonomous  shift in employment  from groups 
with high  levels of unionization  to those with  low levels. 
Perhaps  the most  familiar example of this is the growth  of 
employment  in lightly unionized  services  relative  to more 
highly  unionized  goods production.  But estimates  of 
structural  change have also included the increasing  \ 
proportion  of female workers,  white  collar workers,  and 
workers  in the South.5  Farber  (1985) concluded  that total 
structural  change accounted  for an annual decline  in the 
unionization  rate of  .20 percentage  points  from the mid 
1950s to 1977, Freeman  and Medoff  (1984) found a similar 
value  of  .27 from 1950 to 1977, and Dickens and Leonard 
(1985) found a significantly  higher value of  .63 for a 
shorter  time period  from 1974 to 1980.6 
While  these studies demonstrate  a significant  impact of 
structural  change on unionization  rates prior  to 1980, there 
is one important  qualification.  Each of these  studies 
relies on average values measured  over relatively  long 
5 Structural  change not only alters the proportion  of union 
and nonunion  jobs as measured  here, but could also affect 
the results  of representation  elections.  It is generally 
assumed  that this effect  is relatively  small and can safely 
be ignored.  See Fiorti and Maranto,  1987. 
6 These  estimates  were derived  from the authors'  estimates 
of s, the percentage  of total union decline  accounted  for by 
structural  change.  Estimates  of S ranged  from Farber's  41% 
to 68% for Dickens  and Leonard,  and 72% for Freeman  and 
Medoff.  The estimates  reported  in the text were  converted 
by multiplying  S by the total decline b(U/L) and dividing  by 
the number  of years  in the period. 8 
periods  of time and therefore  overlooks  the strong  cyclical 
nature  of structural  change.  In order to illustrate  this 
point,  an index of structural  change was constructed  which 
is proportional  to the changes  in employment  shares  for 
eight major  sectors  from 1962 to 1989.7  Although  this 
particular  index does not show the specific  effect  of 
structural  change  on unions,  it does indicate  the general 
rate of change  in relative  employment  between  sectors.'  The 
results presented  in Figure  3 show that structural  change  is 
obviously  cyclical,  rising to peaks during  the major 
recessions  of 1975 and 1980.  This  is consistent  with the 
fact that goods producers  tend to experience  greater 
proportional  decreases  in employment  during  economic 
downturns. 
[Insert Figure  31 
Since  structural  change  is cyclical,  one would  expect 
losses  in unionization  associated  with  it to be cyclical  as 
well.  In addition,  one should also expect structural  losses 
to gradually  diminish  over time as unionization  rates of 
expanding  and contracting  industries  become more 
homogeneous.  For example,  in 1962 there was a difference  of 
nearly  40 percentage  points between  unionization  rates  in 
7  The sectors  include: mining,  construction,  manufacturing 
durables,  nondurables,  transportation  and public  utilities, 
wholesale  trade,  retail,  finance/insurance/and  real estate, 
and services.  The index is equal to C (.5)  IA  (Li/L)I where 
equal to the change  in employment  share  for the 
. services  and durable  manufacturing  but by 1989 the 
difference  was only 17 points.  As unionization  rates 
gradually  converged  across the economy,  shifting  employment 
shares had less of an impact on unionization. 
The effect of structural  change on the total 
unionization  rate was calculated  for the same eight sectors 
in order to illustrate  both  its cyclical  nature  and long 
term trend.  The area labeled  tlstructuralll  in Figure  4 
represents  that portion  of gross losses that can be 
attributed  to structural  change.  These particular  losses 
peaked during  the recession  of 1975 and clearly  diminished 
after  1982.  For a brief period between  1983 and 1984, the 
expansion  in the economy  even provided  a slight  structural 
gain.  But on average  from 1982 to 1989, structural  losses 
amounted  to  . 06 percentage  points a year compared  to  .27 
percentage  points  a year  from 1962 to 1976.  As mentioned 
earlier,  the reason that structural  losses subsided  was only 
partly  related  to economic  expansion.  The primary  reason 
was that by 1983 there was significantly  less variation  in 
unionization  rates between  industries. 
[Insert Figure 41 
Estimates  of structural  losses have been criticized 
because  they are based  on the assumption  that unionization 
rates remain constant  within  sectors  (Freeman and Medoff 
1984, p.287).  Consequently,  it is important  to review what 
structural  losses are and perhaps more  importantly,  what they are not.8  Structural  losses are essentially  calculated 
by comparing  the actual change  in unionization  to a 
counterfactual  case which holds unionization  rates constant 
within  each sector. 
To illustrate  this consider  an example where  election 
gains are zero and employment  gains within  every  sector are 
identical  for both union and nonunion workplaces.  While 
unionization  rates within  sectors remain unchanged,  the 
overall  rate can change  if some sectors grow  faster than 
others.  In this particular  situation we would  reach the 
reasonable  conclusion  that all changes  in overall 
unionization  are caused by structural  change.  But in the 
more general  and realistic  case where unionization  rates 
change within  at least some sectors,  structural  change 
simply accounts  for a relatively  smaller  fraction  of the 
total change.  The  fact that unionization  rates change 
within  sectors doesn't  invalidate  the method,  it only 
decreases  the relative  importance  of structural  change. 
Structural  change as an explanation  of declining  U.S. 
unionization  rates has been challenged  on the basis  of 
international  comparisons.  Although  services  have expanded 
in other developed  countries,  like Canada  and Europe, 
8  According  to Freeman  and Medoff  (1984, p.228)  "A more 
realistic  reading  of the evidence  is that structural  factors 
increase  or decrease  the difficulty  of organization  but do 
not determine  unionization.t1  Dickens  and Leonard  (1986) 
conclude,  "The structural  approach  is limited...  This serves 
as an important warning  that other  factors are at work 
beyond  those considered  in structural  models." 11 
overall  unionization  rates have not declined.9  This  is an 
important  point because  it demonstrates  that structural 
change by itself is not sufficient  to ensure  a decrease  in 
unionization.  On the other hand it doesn't  mean  that 
structural  losses were nonexistent  in Canada  or Europe,  only 
that they must have been offset by gains  from increases  in 
unionization  within  sectors,  related perhaps  to 
representation  elections.  \ 
An example  closer to home  is the twenty year period  in 
the U.S. prior to 1955.  At this time structural  shifts 
towards  services were very much  in effect  in the U.S. but 
this did not prevent unions  from enjoying  a spectacular 
expansion.  Even though  structural  losses probably  still 
occurred,  especially  during  recessions,  unions  were  able to 
overcome  them,through  gains  from certification  elections. 
Today unions  are not making  those gains through  elections 
but neither  are they losing as much  from structural  change. 
The fact that unions  are continuing  to lose ground  means we 
must  look at one more source of change  in unionization, 
restructuring. 
Restructuring 
When  structural  change  explains a relatively  small part 
of gross unionization  losses then the difference  must be 
attributed  to changes  in unionization  rates within  sectors, 
9  Fiorito  and Maranto  (1987). 12 
defined  as restructuring.1°  Consequently  gross  losses must 
by definition  equal the sum of losses from structural  change 
and restructuring.  Their  individual  contributions  are 
represented  by the areas  identified  in Figure  4.  The first 
point to notice  is that the effect of restructuring  has been 
consistently  negative  since 1962, implying  a relatively 
slower growth  rate of union workers  compared  to nonunion 
ones.  Second,  the pattern  of union  losses was primarily 
determined  by restructuring  in the 1980s when the effects  of 
elections  and structural  change were almost  insignificant. 
And  finally,  losses  from restructuring  exploded  in 1980 and 
then abruptly  receded  after  1985. 
Before  considering  some of explanations  for the surge  in 
restructuring  losses during the early  198Os, it is useful  to 
consider  some specific  examples.  Restructuring  occurs when 
industries,  (and firms in those  industries)  alter the union 
percentage  of their  labor force.  U.S. Steel underwent  major 
restructuring  as it pruned  its union labor force from 65% in 
the late 1970s to 35% in the mid  1980s.11  It was able to 
accomplish  this reduction  by disproprotionately  reducing 
union  jobs as it slashed  overall employment  by 47 percent. 
To take another  example,  employment  fell in the motor 
10  For each sector we define the employment 
the unionization  rate as Ui, then the total 
share as si and 
unionization 
rate  (U) is given by U = C Uisi.  The total  increment  in U 
(dU,)  is given by dU =  C sidui +  C uidsi where the  first 
term  is restructuring  and the second  is structural.  A 
complete  decomposition  including  certification  elections  and 
employment  changes  are in a technical  appendix  available 
from the author. 
l1  Nader  and Taylor,  1986, page  17. 13 
vehicle  industry by 10% from 1974 to 1980 and unionization 
rates  fell from 72% to 66%.'*  Within this same period, 
General Motors  managed  to open 14 new plants,  9 of them in 
right-to-work  states and 1 in Mexico.13  Restructuring  also 
includes the permanent  replacement  of union workers  during 
unsuccessful  strikes,  the replacement  of striking  air 
traffic  controllers  (PATCO) in 1981 being the most prominent 
example.  In these cases and dozens of others,  restructuring 
by downsizing  operations,  closing plants,  subcontracting 
previously  unionized  work,  replacing  striking  workers,  or 
relocating  production,  provided  employers  with  the 
opportunity  to deunionize  their labor force. 
While most  labor economists  acknowledge  the  important 
role of management  opposition  in representation  elections 
there  is much  less recognition  of how businesses  actively 
undermine  unions through  restructuring.  This  is a serious 
omission  since the systematic  replacement  of union workers 
with  nonunion  ones has become  a prominent  corporate  strategy 
for eliminating  collective  bargaining.  This point  is 
contested  by some economists  who attribute  union  losses  from 
restructuring  to impartial market  forces.  They argue that 
deunionizing  the workforce  is inevitable  as domestic  and 
international  competition  weed out high cost producers.14 
But this  is an overly  simplistic  explanation  which  ignores 
the actual  causes of restructuring. 
l2  Kokkelenberg  and Sockell,  1985. 
l3  Bluestone  and Harrison,  1982, page 167. 
l4  See Linneman  and Wachter,  1986. 14 
Of the many developments  that caused  an acceleration  of 
restructuring  in the U.S. economy  from the late 1970s to the 
mid 198Os, none of them can reasonably  be blamed  on unions. 
Leading up to this period was the deregulation  of trucking 
and airlines,  the second major oil crisis  in 1979, and 
deregulation  of oil prices  in 1980.  In addition,  interest 
rates began their upward trajectory  in the  1970s and reached 
their apex  in 1981 with a prime rate in the neighborhood  of 
20%.  To some degree,  these dramatic  events  aggravated  the 
consecutive  recessions  in 1980 and 1982 which  eventually 
pushed unemployment  to a post-Depression  high of 10.6%. 
None of these  familiar events which  accelerated  the 
rapid transformation  of America's  productive  capacity  can 
reasonably  be blamed  on unions.  Even the  import explosion 
that rocked U.S. manufacturers  in the early  1980s was 
primarily  related  to factors other than trade unions.  In 
fact imports were not disproportionately  concentrated  among 
unionized  industries  but were broadly  distributed  among 
industries  with a wide range of unionization  rates  (Karier, 
forthcoming). 
In one of the few studies of restructuring,  Bluestone 
and Harrison  found that for 8.8 million  net jobs created 
between  1969 and 1976, 35.5 million  were destroyed  and 44.3 
million  new jobs were created.15  In other words,  for every 
five new jobs created  during this period  four existing 
were destroyed.  The small change  in total employment 
l5  Bluestone  and Harrison,  1982, page 30. 
jobs 15 
reported by government  agencies belie the tumultuous 
transformations  in the labor force.  As businesses 
eliminated  old jobs and created new ones, they discovered  an 
unparalleled  opportunity  to reduce their union  coverage  by 
eliminating  union workers,  hiring nonunion  ones, or both. 
Although  unions may not have been responsible  for 
initiating  this period  of extensive  restructuring,  they 
nevertheless  became  a primary victim.  Management  has ,the 
obvious  incentive to deunionize  in order to cut labor costs 
and raise profits  but there  is at least one other  reason  why 
union work places would be disproportionately  affected.  The 
last great union organizing  drive lasted  from approximately 
1934 to 1954 and union gains  in the private  sector have been 
less than  impressive  ever since.  Consequently  by the  1970s 
and 1980s many of the union work places were among the 
oldest  in the country. 
The Homestead  Works of U.S. Steel,  for example,  was 
organized  by the CIO in the 1930s and was closed  in 1986. 
But the first steel rolled out of this mill  in the early 
188Os.16  The steel, auto, and rubber  industries  closed 
dozens  of union plants during the 1970s and 1980s but many 
of these plants had already been  in operation  ten or twenty 
years when they were  first organized  by unions  in the 1930s 
and 40s.  Even a relatively  new plant organized  during WWII 
would have been at least 35 years old by 1980.  The lack of 
union  success  in organizing  new plants  and firms since the 
l6  Hoerr,  1988, page 87. 16 
1950s left unions  concentrated  in the oldest pockets  of the 
economy,  the ones most vulnerable  to restructuring.  In a 
sense, the cumulative  failure of unions  to organize  new work 
places  from 1955 to 1975 exacerbated  the impact of 
restructuring  on unionization  rates from 1976 to 1985. 
Conclusions  \ 
Decomposing  the union decline  into elections,  structural 
change,  and restructuring  reveal trends during  the 1980s 
that would  otherwise  not be apparent.  Unions  are currently 
winning  a miniscule  number of new members  through 
certification  elections  but they are also losing  fewer to 
structural  change.  This means that most  of the fluctuations 
in unionization  rates during the 1980s can be attributed  to 
restructuring  which had a particularly  devastating  impact in 
the early  1980s and then receded to much  lower levels by the 
late 1980s.  The net effect  is that unions 
at a rate of  .47 percentage  points  a year, 
of decrease  since the late 1960s. 
The real challenge  in predicting  where 
are now declining 
the slowest  rate 
unions will be 
ten years  from now isn't merely  to extrapolate  current 
trends,  but to anticipate  new developments  that may disrupt 
the gradual  dissolution  of unions.  There  is, for example,  a 
good possibility  that the record number of plant  closures 
which devastated  unions  in the late 1970s and early  1980s 17 
will now subside  since many of the oldest plants  have been 
closed.  Perhaps the slower union decline  in 1989 is already 
evidence  of this effect. 
There  is also the possibility  that the very  benefits 
that companies  hope to achieve  from a nonunion  labor  force 
will at some future date stimulate  a resurgence  in the union 
movement.  Lower wages  and benefits,  fewer workrules,  and 
more management  discretion  may be appealing  to compani,es 
trying  to rid themselves  of a union workforce  but these are 
the same conditions  that motivated  the original  explosion  in 
union organizing  in the 1930s and 1940s.  Companies  are 
likely to find that they can take full advantage  of their 
newly won nonunion  status  in the short run only at the risk 
of making  unions more appealing  in the long run. 18 
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Annual  Change  in  Unionization  and 
the  Contribution  of  NLRB  Elections 
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. TECHNICAL  APPENDIX 
Accounting  for the Union  Decline  in the 1980s: Elections 
Structural  Change  and Restructuring.  Thomas  Karier 
In the first section  changes  in unionization  are 
decomposed  using calculus.  While this is a useful  method  it 
involves a certain  amount of error when real  increments  are 
used to approximate  exact differentials  in the  formula. 
Therefore  a second method using  increments  is presented  in 
the second section which  is somewhat more precise. 
Union membership  by sector = ui 
Nonunion  workers  by sector = ni 
Employment  by sector  = L'  = ui+ni 
Total union membership  =U=xui 
Total employment  = E = c Li 
Unionization  Rate  = U/E 
Employment  share  = Si  =  L'/E 
\ 
Total  Differential  Method 
We begin with the definition  of the unionization  rate 
as a weighted  average  of unionization  within  each sector. 
1)  U/E  = c si  (%i)=  c  d  (;lnij 
At this point  it is convenient  to drop the summation  sign 
and superscripts.  The total derivative  of equation  1 is 
defined  as, 
2)  d(U/E)  =  (eys  +[.$jdu  - &)dn 
In other words,  the change 
be decomposed  into changes 
in unionization  in equation  2 can 
in employment  shares between 
sectors  (structural change),  and changes  in the number  of 
union members  (u) and nonunion workers  (n) within  sectors. 
We can now introduce  the assumption  that all changes  in 
union membership  or nonunion workers  must arise either  from 
elections  (subscript e) or other changes primarily  related 
to employment  growth  (subscript g). 
3)  du = du, + du, 
dn = dn, + dn, 
Substituting  equation  3 into 2 we have, 4)  d(U/E) =  yds  + 
L 
sn du, + sn  du, 
F  L2 
su dn, - .su  dn, 
F  L2 
This can be simplified  further by recognizing  the fact that 
each union member  gained  from elections  reduces  the number 
of nonunion  workers  (au,=  -dn,).  Substituting  this  into 
equation  4 we have, 
5)  d(U/E)  =  u  ds +  s du, 
L  L 
+  du, -  dn9 
This gives us the basic  form for decomposing  the total 
change  in unionization  into structural  change  (the ds term), 
elections  (due),  and restructuring  (dug  and dng).  The actual 
calculation  involves an approximation  since  increments 
between  two periods must be used to approximate  the exact 
differentials  (i.e.  AS  for ds). 
Total  Increment Method 
Each decomposition  spans at most  four years  and usually 
one year during the 1980s.  This reduces the amount  of error 
involved when using real increments  as an approximation. 
Another  way to further reduce this error is to derive  an 
equation  similar to equation  5 but using only total 
increments.  Although  this requires  considerably  more 
algebra  it results  in a slightly more precise  method  of 
decomposition. 
In this case the total  increment  in the unionization 
rate between  period  2 and 1 is given by, 
6)  A (U/E)  =  (U~/EZ)-VJI/EI) 
where  the subscripts  identify the period.  Although  the 
decomposition  can be accomplished  directly  by substituting 
equation  1 into 6 and solving, there are two simple 
which  are very helpful.  These are described  as 
7)  If c=ab then AC= KAb + EAa  where a =  (az+al)/2 
'is= (bt+b1)/2 
If c= l/(a+b) then 
AC= -(czcl)Aa  -(c$l)Ab 
The decomposition  is accomplished  by applying  these general 
rules to equation  1.  As in the case of total differentials, 
1  These  rules are not proven here but they are 
straightforward  to derive. the change  in union membership  within  an industry must be 
further decomposed  into an election  term  (AU,)  and an 
employment  term  (AU,),  where, 
8) AU  =  AU.  +  AU, 
An  =  A&  +  An, 
AU,  =  -A& 
Solving all of this  is a tedious algebraic  problem  but the 
result  is, 
9)  A(U/E) = g\As  + s(%JAue  + 5 ($,I4  - = c&l\hng 
- 
(l/2)  cwL2+ul/Lll  and,  s =  (l/2)  [=+z+s11 
\ 
Although  this equation  closely  resembles  equation  5 it 
has one important  advantage.  Since  it was derived  in terms 
of increments,  no approximation  is involved  in using  real 
data.  In fact even if the observations  are many years 
apart, the components  calculated  in equation  9 will  always 
exactly  equal the change  in total unionization.  It is this 
formula which  is used to decompose  unionization  in the 
paper. 
All of the variables  in equation  9 are available  from 
Bureau of Labor Statistic  publications  except  for A&,  Aug, 
and Ang  which  represent  union changes  from elections  and 
growth and the nonunion  change from growth  in each sector. 
Since total gains  from elections  are available  (see page 4), 
these were allocated  to each sector  in proportion  to each 
sector's  share of total union membership.2  This provided  an 
eStiImte  of AI&.  Since  AU  is known,  AUg  and Ang can be 
derived  from the equations  in 8 above. 
2  This assumption  corresponds  well with evidence  from NLRB 
elections. 